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FACTS AND FICTIONS OF CORPORATE 
EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY 
Masaki Iwasaki* 
 
U.S. Senator and former Democratic presidential contender Elizabeth 
Warren recently proposed the Corporate Executive Accountability Act, a bill 
that lowers the level of mental state required to prosecute executives for any 
corporate crime.  A nationwide debate has been raging over this Act, but 
most arguments have focused on the appropriateness of the relaxed 
requirement, and the whole picture of executive accountability is vague.  This 
Essay reveals what the facts and fictions of corporate executive 
accountability are, focusing on the degree of punishment of criminal 
executives.  The author presents the estimates of expected direct and indirect 
punishments of executives and considers other options to deter corporate 
crimes, options that could be used with or without the proposed Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 3, 2019, U.S. Senator and former Democratic presidential 
contender Elizabeth Warren proposed a bill titled the Corporate Executive 
Accountability Act1 (the “Act”), which would dramatically change the 
enforcement of corporate criminal law if the bill is enacted.  In many 
corporate crimes, an intent to commit a crime is required for criminal liability 
and mere negligence is not sufficient. However, the Act relaxes this standard 
to negligence for any corporate crime;2  under the Act, it will be unlawful for 
an executive of a corporation with more than $1 billion in revenue to 
negligently permit or fail to prevent a corporate offense.3 
 
*  Terence M. Considine Fellow in Law and Economics at Harvard Law School; Associate at 
Nishimura & Asahi; J.S.M., Stanford Law School.  The author is grateful to Bala Dharan, 
Reinier Kraakman, J. Mark Ramseyer, Steven Shavell, Holger Spamann, Kathryn E. Spier, 
and Wataru Tanaka for their helpful comments.  He is also grateful to Lena Bruce, Salvatore 
Cocchiaro, Rebecca Guthrie, Leili Saber, and Nora Stewart for their excellent editorial work. 
For financial support, the author thanks Harvard Law School’s Summer Academic Fellowship 
and Terence M. Considine Fellowship through the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, 
and Business. 
 
 1. S. 1010, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 2. Id. § 2. 
 3. Id. 
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While the Act has been endorsed by several influential organizations such 
as Public Citizen and Americans for Financial Reform,4 some have fiercely 
questioned the desirability of the Act.5  Most arguments over the Act have 
focused on the appropriateness of the relaxed requirement, and it is unclear 
to what extent this type of reform is necessary and whether other options 
exist.  Different views seem to implicitly assume that the punishment of 
executives is currently either sufficient or insufficient, but those views rarely 
show empirical support for their assumptions. 
This Essay reveals the facts and fictions of corporate executive 
accountability, focusing on the punishment of criminal executives.  The aim 
of this short piece is not to discuss the desirability of the Act, which would 
require a substantial number of pages.  Rather, this Essay presents estimates 
of the expected punishment of executives to show that the current deterrence 
of corporate crime is probably insufficient.  Then the author explores other 
options we may have in order to improve deterrence.  The options featured 
here are whistleblower reward programs and corporate self-reporting 
schemes.  These options could be used with or without the Act.  Readers’ 
judgment on the Act would be facilitated if other options are presented at the 
same time. 
Part I presents the rough estimates of expected direct and indirect 
punishments of criminal executives.  Part II shows how whistleblower 
reward programs can improve the enforcement of corporate criminal law.  
Part III considers whether and how corporate self-reporting schemes can 
enhance deterrence.  Part IV concludes. 
I.  DIRECT AND INDIRECT PUNISHMENTS OF CRIMINAL EXECUTIVES 
If an executive commits a corporate crime, this individual is exposed to 
two expected punishments:  direct and indirect punishments.  If the executive 
is prosecuted and convicted, this person will suffer direct punishment, such 
as fines and imprisonment.  Moreover, the executive may suffer indirect 
punishment through a reduction in his or her wealth if a company suffers a 
corporate sanction.  In U.S. public companies, executives such as chief 
executive officers (CEOs), receive significant stocks and options as their 
compensation.6  If a company is sanctioned, its value will decrease, and its 
 
 4. See Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Senator Warren Unveils Bill to Expand Criminal 
Liability to Negligent Executives of Giant Corporations (Apr. 3, 2019), https:// 
www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senator-warren-unveils-bill-to-expand-
criminal-liability-to-negligent-executives-of-giant-corporations [https://perma.cc/P4G3-
59G2]. 
 5. See, e.g., Carissa Byrne Hessick & Benjamin Levin, Elizabeth Warren’s Proposal to 
Imprison More Corporate Executives Is a Bad Idea, SLATE (Apr. 4, 2019, 1:39 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/04/elizabeth-warren-corporate-fraud-prison-
negligence-mass-incarceration.html [https://perma.cc/ADP7-JBJ5]. 
 6. See, e.g., David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, CEO Compensation:  Data Spotlight, 
STAN. GRADUATE SCH. BUS.: CORP. GOVERNANCE RES. INITIATIVE, 
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executives’ compensation may decrease as well.  If corporate crimes are 
detected, companies may need to disgorge illicit profits, pay fines, and suffer 
reputational loss, all of which reduce their stock prices and thus reduce the 
wealth of their executives. 
Given this background, this Essay attempts to roughly estimate the 
expected direct and indirect punishments of CEOs of U.S. public companies, 
based on data from prior literature.7  The results are presented in Table 1.  
We first calculate the probabilities of detecting a corporate crime and 
prosecuting a CEO.  For fraud cases of large U.S. public companies, I. J. 
Alexander Dyck et al. estimated that the probability of detecting a crime is 
approximately 33 percent.8  We can also calculate the conditional probability 
of prosecuting a CEO given a crime detection, based on the study of Brandon 
L. Garrett.9  His sample includes 306 deferred and non-prosecution 
agreements with U.S. public and private companies, with the sample period 
ranging from 2001 to 2014.10  In these cases, 26 CEOs were prosecuted,11 
and thus the conditional probability of CEO prosecution can be estimated as 
8.5 percent. 
Executives, including CEOs, do not necessarily engage in corporate crimes 
even if their company commits crimes.  If so, the true conditional probability 
of CEO prosecution would be higher than 8.5 percent.  However, the 
estimated number would not be significantly different from the actual 
number.  Executives often play a leadership role in large-scale corporate 
crimes, but they are rarely prosecuted.12  Prosecuting individuals is 
practically more difficult than prosecuting corporations.13 
Next, we calculate the direct punishment.  According to Garrett’s study, 
the mean fine is $381,000 for individuals prosecuted and fined, and the mean 
jail time is 18 months for individuals sentenced.14  Hence, by multiplying (1) 
these numbers by (2) the probability of crime detection by (3) the conditional 
probability of CEO prosecution, the expected direct punishment can be 
roughly estimated at a fine of $10,687 and a jail time of 0.5 months.  One 
 
https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/sites/gsb/files/publication-pdf/cgri-quick-guide-17-ceo-
compensation-data.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TFF-HXYJ] (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 7. The explanation of Table 1 draws on the analysis in Masaki Iwasaki, A Model of 
Corporate Self-Policing and Self-Reporting (Harvard John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper 
Series No. 88, 2019), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/ 
pdf/Iwasaki_88.pdf [https://perma.cc/9672-4JWJ]. 
 8. I. J. Alexander Dyck et al., How Pervasive is Corporate Fraud? 2 (2017) (unpublished 
manuscript).  An earlier version of the paper is available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222608 [https://perma.cc/RU7R-BLSQ]. 
 9. Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA. L. REV. 1789 
(2015). 
 10. Id. at 1791.  Data including only public companies is not available. 
 11. Id. at 1802. 
 12. See, e.g., RENA STEINZOR, WHY NOT JAIL?:  INDUSTRIAL CATASTROPHES, CORPORATE 
MALFEASANCE, AND GOVERNMENT INACTION 5 (2014). 
 13. See, e.g., BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATIONS, CRIME AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY 57 (1993). 
 14. Garrett, supra note 9, at 1813, 1833. 
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caveat is that the true direct punishment of CEOs is likely to be higher than 
the estimated value because the data of the mean fines and jail time includes 
both senior executives and lower-level employees.  But even if the fine 
amount is adjusted upward, because of the low probabilities of crime 
detection and CEO prosecution, the expected direct punishment would still 
be low.  Another caveat is that CEOs may suffer reputational loss and face 
the risk of dismissal, which are not calculated here because it is difficult to 
obtain data for that calculation. 
Lastly, regarding the indirect punishment, according to David Larcker and 
Brian Tayan, a 1 percent change in stock price leads to a median change of 
$193,000 in CEO wealth for U.S. public companies.15  Furthermore, 
according to a study by Jason Pierce, corporate prosecution decreases the 
stock price of a U.S. public company by approximately 11 percent.16  
Therefore, by multiplying (1) the probability of crime detection by (2) the 
change in CEO wealth with a 1 percent stock price change by (3) the impact 
of corporate prosecution on stock price, the expected indirect punishment can 
be estimated at $700,590. 
These data suggest that the total expected punishment of executives is 
unlikely to be sufficiently large relative to the expected illicit profits to these 
individuals from committing crimes.  Indeed, illicit profits from corporate 
crimes are known to be huge in many cases when compared to the amounts 
of fines.17  The data also imply that the expected direct punishment may not 
significantly increase even if the probability of crime detection is increased 
because the conditional probability of CEO prosecution, the expected amount 
of fines, and the expected length of imprisonment remain at low levels.  
Although CEOs may be exposed to additional punishments, such as 
reputational loss and dismissal, these costs are unlikely to be high because of 
the low probability of executive prosecution. 
The gist of the Act is to raise the conditional probability of CEO 
prosecution by easing the existing difficulties of proof.  While the Act would 
have social benefits from enhancing deterrence, it may also have social costs.  
Thus, the social benefits and costs from introducing the Act should be 
carefully evaluated.  The desirability of this particular solution is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but the estimates above at least demonstrate that some 
changes would be necessary to improve deterrence.  In order to enhance 
deterrence, there are three options:  (1) increasing the probability of crime 
detection, (2) raising the conditional probability of executive prosecution, 
and (3) imposing greater fines and longer prison sentences.  Increasing fines 
and the length of sentences may be difficult because their maximum values 
are constrained by factors such as considerations of fairness and the wealth 
 
 15. Larcker & Tayan, supra note 6. 
 16. Jason R. Pierce, Reexamining the Cost of Corporate Criminal Prosecution, 44 J. 
MGMT. 892, 911 (2018). 
 17. See, e.g., John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Does Crime Pay?:  Cartel Penalties 
and Profits, ANTITRUST, Spring 2019, at 29, 33. 
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of wrongdoers,18 and thus this Essay focuses on the first two measures in the 
next two parts. 
Table 1:  Direct and Indirect Punishments of CEOs 
1.  Probabilities  
Probability of crime detection 33% 
Conditional probability of CEO 
prosecution 
8.5% 
2.  Direct punishment  
Individual fine $381,000 
Jail time 18 months 
Expected direct punishment $10,687 
 0.5 months 
3.  Indirect punishment  
Change in CEO wealth with 1% stock 
change 
$193,000 
Impact of corporate prosecution on stock 
price 
11% 
Expected indirect punishment $700,590 
II.  WHISTLEBLOWER REWARD PROGRAMS 
Corporate crimes are extremely difficult to detect because the harms 
caused by these crimes are often invisible.  While unlawful business 
activities, such as false financial disclosure and illegal marketing, cause harm 
to society, the victims often do not realize that they are victims.  Furthermore, 
because of information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders 
about corporate activities, collecting evidence is difficult for enforcement 
agencies.19  Moreover, in corporate crimes, executives often order illegal 
strategies but are not engaged in day-to-day conduct.20  Thus, obtaining 
evidence of executives’ criminal involvement is difficult. 
Whistleblowers can solve these difficulties by providing inside 
information to enforcement agencies.  They often have access to critical 
evidence as corporate insiders and can increase the probabilities of both 
crime detection and executive prosecution.  In the case of the defective 
airbags of Takata, a Japanese automotive parts company, employees’ 
 
 18. Thomas J. Miceli, Optimal Criminal Procedure:  Fairness and Deterrence, 11 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 3, 4 (1991); see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law 
Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583, 586 (1994). 
 19. Masaki Iwasaki, Effects of External Whistleblower Rewards on Internal Reporting 6 
(Harvard John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, No. 76, 2018), http:// 
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Iwasaki_76.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/K73U-SJUX]. 
 20. Iwasaki, supra note 7, at 2. 
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whistleblowing led to the indictment of the company’s executives as well as 
the largest automotive recall in U.S. history.21  Proof of corporate crime 
requires knowledge of companies’ business and technology, and potential 
whistleblowers, such as employees, are in the best position to help 
enforcement agencies. 
In fact, many jurisdictions have increasingly relied on whistleblowers to 
detect corporate crimes.  Over the past three decades, a large number of 
countries have established whistleblower legislation to protect 
whistleblowers from wrongdoers’ retaliation.22  In addition, some countries, 
such as the United States, Canada, and South Korea, have provided monetary 
rewards to incentivize whistleblowers.23  Whistleblowers need time and 
effort to collect evidence; furthermore, they are exposed to the risk of 
retaliation, such as dismissal, all of which can be significant costs to them.  
Therefore, whistleblower protection laws and reward programs can improve 
the balance of the personal benefits and costs of whistleblowing and 
encourage corporate insiders to blow the whistle. 
The United States has whistleblower reward programs for several 
categories of crime, such as securities and tax fraud, and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) program under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act24 has recently expanded.  In this 
program, whistleblowers can receive a reward when they provide original 
information that leads to an enforcement action in which more than 
$1,000,000 in sanctions is ordered.25  Whistleblower rewards range from 10 
percent to 30 percent of the monetary sanctions imposed on corporations.26  
Since the establishment of the program in 2011, the SEC has paid 
approximately $326 million to fifty-nine whistleblowers.27 
Figure 1 shows the number of whistleblower tips received by the SEC (the 
left vertical axis) and the reward amounts from the Investor Protection Fund 
(the “Fund”), from which whistleblowers are paid (the right vertical axis), in 
recent fiscal years.28  Both whistleblower tips and reward amounts show a 
 
 21. David Shepardson, Takata Whistleblowers to Share $1.7 Million Award, Lawyers Say, 
REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-takata-
whistleblowers/takata-whistleblowers-to-share-1-7-million-award-lawyers-say-
idUSKBN1H32A2 [https://perma.cc/NUN5-5R5A]. 
 22. Iwasaki, supra note 19, at 7. 
 23. CAITLIN MASLEN, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, WHISTLEBLOWER REWARD PROGRAMMES 3 
(2018), https://knowledgehub.transparency.org/assets/uploads/helpdesk/Whistleblower-
Reward-Programmes-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/JT6S-6KF3]. 
 24. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2018). 
 26. Id. 
 27. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:  WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROGRAM 1 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/sec-2018-annual-report-whistleblower-program.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P7DG-2CTC]. 
 28. The data were taken from the SEC’s annual reports to Congress for the years 2011 
through 2018. See Reports and Publications, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/reports?aId=edit-tid&year=All&field_article_sub_type_secart_value= 
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rapidly increasing trend in the past eight years, and the most recent numbers 
are 5,282 tips and $94 million, respectively.  While our interest lies in 
whether the SEC’s whistleblower program can improve the deterrence of 
corporate crime, empirical studies have shown that the introduction of the 
SEC’s whistleblower program reduced accounting fraud significantly.29 
Although whistleblower reward programs have already been utilized in the 
United States to detect certain types of violations such as securities and tax 
fraud, there is room for the expansion and reform of these programs.  For 
example, expanding the types of violations covered by whistleblower reward 
programs may be worth consideration.  In fact, Congress passed the Motor 
Vehicle Safety Whistleblower Act in 2015 to grant rewards for 
whistleblowing on automotive safety violations.30  Furthermore, the waiting 
period for whistleblowers to receive awards seems long and should probably 
be shortened.  In the case of the whistleblower reward program of the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), it generally takes at least eight years to receive a 
reward after filing a claim.31  This would discourage potential whistleblowers 
to take action. 
 
Reports+and+Publications-AnnualReports&tid=59 [https://perma.cc/F57X-ZY4E] (last 
visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 29. See, e.g., Philip G. Berger & Heemin Lee, Do Corporate Whistleblower Laws Deter 
Accounting Fraud? 7 (Mar. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3059231 [https://perma.cc/TV9W-R35R]. 
 30. 49 U.S.C. § 30172 (2018). 
 31. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM:  FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS 9 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/fy18_wo_annual 
_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC2M-LRW7]. 
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Figure 1:  Whistleblowing Tips and Amounts Paid from the Fund 
III.  CORPORATE SELF-REPORTING SCHEMES 
Another option to improve the deterrence of corporate crime is to make 
corporations themselves report their crimes.  Jennifer Arlen and Reinier 
Kraakman suggested that, by granting self-reporting companies rewards in 
the form of reduced corporate sanctions, corporate self-reporting schemes 
can incentivize companies to self-police and disclose their organizational 
members’ crimes.32  If firms have incentive to detect and self-report their 
corporate crimes, individual criminals such as executives and employees are 
more likely to be prosecuted and suffer the direct punishment, such as fines 
and imprisonment.  Corporate self-reporting schemes may therefore increase 
the expected direct punishment of criminal executives by increasing the 
probability of crime detection. 
In order for corporate self-reporting schemes to work effectively, several 
conditions must be satisfied.  First, companies must have effective 
compliance systems, and their boards and compliance officers must be 
incorruptible enough to self-police and self-report the companies’ offenses.  
Second, the expected direct punishment must be severe to a certain extent 
even when there are no corporate self-reporting schemes.  These schemes 
essentially sacrifice the indirect punishment of executives for the direct 
punishment of them.33  Reducing corporate sanctions means that the impact 
of corporate sanctions on executives’ wealth, such as stocks and options, is 
 
 32. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct:  An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 753 (1997). 
 33. Iwasaki, supra note 7, at 6. 
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also reduced, which decreases the expected indirect punishment of 
executives.  Even if the probability of crime detection increases by 
companies’ self-policing and self-reporting, if the expected direct 
punishment is originally too low, the increase in the expected direct 
punishment of executives is offset by the decrease in the expected indirect 
punishment. 
As explained with Table 1, the conditional probability of executive 
prosecution, given the detection of a crime, is likely to be low, and thus the 
expected direct punishment would not be high relative to the expected 
indirect punishment.  In this circumstance, the strategy to sacrifice the 
indirect punishment for the direct punishment may not be useful, and hence 
corporate self-reporting schemes may not work effectively.  Although 
enforcement agencies such as the SEC and the Department of Justice have 
already used corporate self-reporting schemes as an enforcement tool, 
deterrence may not have significantly improved. 
One way to overcome this impasse is increasing the probabilities of crime 
detection and executive prosecution by extensive use of whistleblower tips.  
As explained above, whistleblower rewards have potential to increase the 
probabilities of executive prosecution as well as crime detection.  Moreover, 
if employees’ whistleblowing is more likely to occur, companies’ board 
members and compliance officers may be more incentivized to self-police 
and self-report in an incorruptible manner. 
CONCLUSION 
The estimate of expected punishment of corporate executives implies that 
the level of deterrence may be insufficient in the current enforcement regime.  
To improve deterrence, there are two ways:  increasing the probability of 
crime detection and increasing the conditional probability of executive 
prosecution given the crime detection.  The proposed Accountability Act 
would ease the difficulty of proof in executive prosecution by lowering the 
level of mental state required for criminal liability, but the social costs and 
benefits of introducing this solution must be carefully evaluated.  This Essay 
explored other solutions, which can be used to improve deterrence regardless 
of the introduction of the Act.  The most promising option seems to be the 
expansion and reform of whistleblower reward programs.  This should also 
help corporate self-reporting schemes work more effectively.  The combined 
use of such whistleblower reward programs and corporate self-reporting 
schemes would improve deterrence by increasing the probabilities of crime 
detection and executive prosecution. 
